Buffalo Law Review
Volume 53

Number 3

Article 7

7-1-2005

Giving the Gift of Public Office
James A. Gardner
University at Buffalo School of Law, jgard@buffalo.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Law and Society Commons, and the Public Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
James A. Gardner, Giving the Gift of Public Office, 53 Buff. L. Rev. 859 (2005).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol53/iss3/7

This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

Giving the Gift of Public Office
JAMES A. GARDNERt

I
In 1996, at the age of ninety-three, Strom Thurmond
announced that he would seek reelection to his U.S. Senate
seat from South Carolina, a seat to which he was first
elected in 1954, following what had already been a twentyyear career in public service as a county official, state
senator, governor, and presidential candidate. At the time
of his announcement, Thurmond's mental acuity had for
some years been the subject of quiet doubt. On Capitol Hill,
it was an open secret that Thurmond relied almost entirely
on his staff to do the real work of the office and that his
main activities consisted of photo opportunities and naps.
Thurmond's Democratic opponent in the 1996 race, real
estate developer Elliott Close, demanded repeatedly that
Thurmond debate him, a demand that Thurmond's
campaign repeatedly refused. With his hair dyed a shocking
shade of red, Thurmond cut an absurd figure. He looked
ridiculous. He was ridiculous. Had it been possible to
detach the man from his record, his candidacy would have
been a joke. Yet the people of South Carolina returned
Thurmond to office by a comfortable margin of nine
percentage points over his Democratic challenger. Why?
In 1988, the entertainer Sonny Bono ran for and was
elected Mayor of Palm Springs, California, and then ran
successfully in 1994 for the U.S. House of Representatives.
Bono had enjoyed brief fame during the 1970s as half of the
pop vocal duo Sonny and Cher, which had recorded several
hit songs and hosted a television variety show from 1971 to
1974. He was widely, and quite obviously correctly, known
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as the less talented, even untalented, half of the duo. While
Bono was no doubt a shrewd manager and businessman, he
adopted for Sonny and Cher's act the persona of a colossal
jerk. He was convincing. When Cher divorced him in 1975
and began a highly successful solo career as a singer and
actress, Bono faded from the public eye. Why would the
people of Palm Springs elect to high public office a man who
had become famous for being an untalented, if likeable,
idiot?
The story of Sonny Bono's political career would be
strange enough if it ended there, but it didn't. In 1998, Bono
died in a skiing accident. A special election was held to fill
the remainder of his term. The winner of that election was
Mary Bono, Sonny's widow, who had married Sonny
following her graduation from college and thereafter had
been a full-time mother and homemaker. Mary Bono's
election to replace her late husband is, in fact, only one of
the most recent examples of a fairly common phenomenon
in American electoral politics. In the last eighty years,
nearly forty widows have been elected to the House seats
formerly occupied by their deceased husbands, and they
have a combined record, in running for these seats, of
thirty-seven victories against only two defeats.' What
gives? Why would Americans elect to Congress more than
three dozen individuals whose main qualification for office
is that they happened to have been married to a
Congressman at the time of his death?
One might easily go on. Why, in 1986, did voters elect
Clint Eastwood mayor of Carmel, California, at a time
when, before his recent public retooling as a sensitive
auteur, he was known merely as a stupendously bad actor?
Why did Californians elect Arnold Schwarzenegger-an
unreconstructed stupendously bad actor-their governor?
Why, for that matter, did voters return George W. Bush to
the White House after a first term of, at best, no significant
positive accomplishments?
The reason in all these cases is simple: they asked for
it. What all these individuals have in common is that they
wanted, for reasons best known to themselves and
apparently irrelevant to voters, to occupy a high public
1. See Chris Cillizza, A Spouse in the House, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 2005,

at 40, 40.
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office, and asked for that privilege in circumstances where
the public had the power and the opportunity to grant their
wish. These men and women, in other words, asked the
people for a gift, a gift only the people have the power to
bestow-the gift of public office-and the people obliged.
Certainly none of them could make any claim to the
people's votes according to the standards we conventionally
apply to election contests. Although highly experienced,
Strom Thurmond, at the age of ninety-three, was qualified
to retire, not to spend another six years in the Senate.
Sonny Bono was perhaps qualified to open a restaurant,
which is what B-list celebrities did in the days before
reality television. Mary Bono was qualified to get on with
her life, not to take a seat in Congress. These people did not
win office on the strength of any particular qualification.
They got the job simply and exclusively because the public
happened to like them, and believed that the appropriate
way to treat people whom you like, and who want something you have the power to provide, is to do the nice thing
and give them what they want. Office was dispensed in all
these cases not, as we conventionally suppose, as a means
of implementing public policy or of holding government
accountable to the popular will, but simply as a kind of
reward-a reward for having in some way, at some time,
done something to please, or entertain, or otherwise gain
the personal favor of the jurisdiction's voters. There is a
word we use to describe the dispensing of office to people
upon whom someone with authority wishes to confer a
personal favor: patronage. Sometimes we also use another
word for this: corruption.
II
In the eighteenth century, electoral and voting practices
were understood very differently than they are today.
During the colonial period, Americans lived political lives
typical of British subjects. Their politics occurred within a
royalist structure of hierarchy and dependence with the
monarch at its source. In this system, the practice of
political patronage played a central role. As Gordon Wood
has explained, the Crown dispensed office as a way of
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reinforcing royal authority. 2 Under this "patrimonial
conception
of officeholding,"
colonial politics was
"essentially a contest among prominent families for the
control of state authority. '3 Ordinary people, Wood argued,
simply did not understand government in the contemporary
sense of a vehicle "by which economic and social power
might be redistributed or the problems of their lives
resolved." 4 Instead, general acquiescence to the holding of
political power by social elites5 was based primarily on
"traditional habits of deference."
Although the Revolution led to the death of many ideas
and practices, it did not immediately wipe out the habits of
political and social deference with which the founding
generation had grown up. Men of power and wealth in the
late eighteenth century expected, and received, deference
from those of lesser social standing, and this deference
extended to the newly reshaped political realm. Thomas
Jefferson may have advanced the radically democratic idea
that the Revolution would replace a hereditary aristocracy
with a "natural aristocracy" of talent and virtue, but even
Jefferson did not conceive that members of this natural
aristocracy would not continue to enjoy the kind of
deference that had formerly been reserved for those whose
claim to status had derived from the king. Good
republicans, that is, believed-not without reason-that
ordinary voters would simply recognize the outstanding
men among them, defer to their talent, and give them their
due by elevating them to office. That is why, for example,
good eighteenth-century republicans such as Washington,
Adams, Jefferson, and Madison would never have dreamed
of campaigning actively for office in the modern sense. The
person of true republican virtue and quality would merely
stand for office, not seek it out; the votes would come to him
as a matter of entitlement.
Might our current voting practices, then, be seen as a
revival of the eighteenth-century practice of political
2. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 80-

81 (1992). To the same effect, see FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM:
THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 83 (1985).

3. WOOD, supra note 2, at 86, 87.
4. Id. at 87.
5. See id. at 88.
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deference, but with the distinctly modern substitution of
celebrity for civic talent and virtue? Have we reached a
point where we elect celebrities to office because, in the
twenty-first century, celebrities comprise the new aristocracy to whom the rest of us owe not only social but electoral
deference? Although this explanation has some possible
appeal in the case of a Hollywood A-list personality like
Arnold Schwarzenegger, it doesn't quite fit the evidence.
First, many of the seemingly unqualified people who have
been elected or returned to office had no prior claim to
celebrity before entering politics. That is most clearly the
case for the widows of public officials, many of whom had
previously shunned the limelight before the deaths of their
husbands propelled them into the public eye. To be sure, all
of these people have in some way come to public attention,
but commanding the public's attention is not the same
thing as commanding its deference.
Second, Americans' relation to their celebrities is not
really one of deference in the traditional mode. In the old
order, deference and patronage were two sides of the same
coin; each party to the relationship had clear and reciprocal
obligations. Nevertheless, according to the rules of that
system, public displays of deference by social inferiors were
obligatory, even to the undeserving, and any member of the
lower orders who failed to abide by prevailing social norms
risked harsh, if largely informal, punishment. It is true that
the American system of celebrity also imposes reciprocal
obligations on those whom the public favors with its
attention; for example, one quid pro quo for enjoying the
benefits of contemporary celebrity appears to be the
obligation to expose the intimate details of one's private life.
Yet those who live by the code of celebrity are entitled to
the public's gaze, not its votes. Election to public office is
not obligatory in the way that eighteenth-century social
deference was obligatory; on the contrary, the dispensing of
public office, even among celebrities, involves the use of
some degree of judgment and discretion by the voting
public. That is why Tom Hanks and Oprah Winfrey could
easily obtain public office just by asking for it, but
Roseanne Barr and Ben Affleck could not.
A more apt precursor of contemporary politics may well
be found in the political practices of the nineteenth century.
Within a few decades following the Revolution, prevailing
American political norms changed dramatically. Social
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relations based on status and hierarchy yielded to a kind of
radical egalitarianism in which Americans "came to believe
that no one in a basic down-to-earth and day-in-and-day-out
manner was really better than anyone else."' 6 By the 1820s,
the long-settled understanding of the relationship between
the people and their leaders had reversed itself in the
public mind. Instead of conceiving of politics as the
enterprise of choosing the wisest and most virtuous citizens
to lead their inferiors, Americans of the Jacksonian era
came to understand politics as a continual struggle by an
intrinsically wise and virtuous populace to avoid being
cheated and enslaved by corrupt and small-minded
politicians.
This ideological reversal now cast the ordinary voter in
the role of a kind of democratic king: he was not judged by
the powerful, but judged them; his activities were not
offered to the high and mighty for their approval, but theirs
for his; he did not seek handouts from the powerful, but
himself did the handing out. In this environment, political
practices understandably changed. To gain office in the
nineteenth century, candidates could no longer rely on their
reputation, character, or social position and wait for office
to come to them. Instead, candidates had to seek office
actively, and were required to do so in the way that one
would seek anything from a king, even a democratic one: by
pleading for it. As a result, politics during the nineteenth
century became a combination of public spectacle and
personal supplication in which candidates sought to
compete by any means possible for public favor.
Democratic politics in the nineteenth century was thus
to a great extent a form of public entertainment; it was,
quite simply, "the best show in town," 7 especially in rural
areas where other forms of entertainment were not widely
available. The public turned out in great numbers for
speeches and debates, and listened patiently to hours of
oration, but not so much to be informed as to be diverted or
moved. Votes in this era "were given not on principle, or as
a manifestation of policy preferences, but as a matter of

6. Id. at 234.
7. MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE GOOD CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CIVIC

LIFE 136 (1998).

2005]

GIVING THE GIFT OFPUBLIC OFFICE

865

personal reward or favor."8 It was possible, in these
circumstances, for candidates to run and win on platforms
very different from those we would deem acceptable today.
Altschuler and Blumin, for example, report the following
campaign advertisement placed in a local newspaper by one
Joshua Walker, the incumbent coroner of Richmond
County, Georgia, in his 1850 bid for reelection: "I am poor
and unfortunate, . . . and therefore it is that I am
constrained thus to appeal to your generosity .... Snatch
from me the perquisites of this office, and you virtually
doom myself and little ones to almost certain want and
poverty." 9 Walker's ad made no mention of his partisan
affiliation and said nothing about his performance during
his first term. Nevertheless, his coarse appeal apparently
succeeded, for the poor fellow was reelected to draw a
paycheck at public expense for another term.
In this nineteenth-century politics of individualized
pleasure and personal favor, then, may perhaps be found
the roots of the phenomenon that leads, in our own time, to
the reelection of a well-liked, ninety-three-year-old father
figure who is really too old to serve; or the election of a
popular actor with no obvious qualifications or experience;
or the election of a presumptively poor, miserable widow
who, if there is any mercy or justice in the world, ought to
inherit her husband's public office just as a farmer's wife
might inherit the family farm. The voters, that is, dispense
the office as a favor or reward to an individual who has
given them a few hours of pleasing entertainment or has
touched their heartstrings with a tale of personal suffering.
But why public office? Why not a pension, or their picture
on a stamp? The reason, apparently, is because that's not
what they asked for. The elderly pol, the actor, the widoweach has asked for a seat in the legislature or in city hall,
and if that is what they want, why, isn't that just what they
should get? After all, what skin is it off our backs?

8. DAVID ZAREFSKY, LINCOLN, DOUGLAS, AND SLAVERY: IN THE CRUCIBLE OF
PUBLIC DEBATE 26 (1990).
9. GLENN C. ALTSCHULER & STUART M. BLUMIN, RUDE REPUBLIC: AMERICANS
AND THEIR POLITICS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 58 (2000).
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III
There is, of course, an important difference between
handing out public office as a gift or reward in the
nineteenth century and doing it in the twenty-first: the
twentieth century intervened. Voting practices in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries reflected thenprevailing social and political norms, and however
unfavorably we might assess those practices according to
the standards of our own time, we cannot very plausibly
claim that they were particularly illicit or out of place in
their own. In today's world, however-the world created by
the twentieth century-those practices are badly out of
place, for American norms of democratic politics underwent
a dramatic revolution during the last hundred years. 10
The deference that eighteenth-century voters displayed
toward their social superiors was more than a thoughtless
transplantation of royalist social practices to a democratic
political order; it was, on the contrary, a logical
manifestation of a widely embraced, if transitional, ideology
of democratic politics. According to that ideology, ordinary
voters in a democracy possessed only a very limited kind of
competence: the competence necessary to distinguish wise
and virtuous men from foolish and venal ones. On this view,
the ordinary person-poorly educated, uninformed, and
typically lacking both the innate capacity and the leisure
time to comprehend public affairs-could not be expected to
evaluate something as complex as competing policy
alternatives. On the other hand, such individuals could be
expected to do a very good job at evaluating a person's
character, something that
was, in Montesquieu's words,
"obvious to the sense."11 According to Jefferson, the
ordinary yeoman, in virtue of his plain simplicity and
earthy connection to the real world, was actually in a better
position than his social superiors to evaluate a man's
character: "State a moral case to a ploughman and a
professor. The former will decide it as well, and often better
than the latter, because he has not been led astray by
10. The argument of this section draws heavily on James A. Gardner,
Madison's Hope: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Design of Electoral Systems, 86
IOWA L. REV. 87, 114-36 (2000).
11. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 9 (Franz Neumann ed.,

Thomas Nugent trans., Hafner Press 1949) (1748).
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artificial rules."'1 2 Eighteenth-century voting practices thus
arose from, and displayed a kind of organic congruence
with, that era's prevailing ontology of citizenship.
Much the same can be said of political practices in the
nineteenth century. Breaking decisively with eighteenthcentury norms, the radically leveling political ideology of
the early nineteenth century stressed both the democratic
equality and the fundamental political competence of
ordinary citizens. For Jacksonians, the ordinary American
voter was not only "good, trustworthy, and capable of selfrule,"'1 3 but actually superior in virtue to his ostensible
rulers-a set of beliefs that fully justified the era's rapid
expansion of the scope of the franchise to something
approaching universal white male suffrage. At the same
time, nineteenth-century understandings of democratic
governance also broke with their predecessors by denying
that the business of governing was any more difficult,
demanding, or complex than any other occupation to which
a person might aspire. As Andrew Jackson contended in an
1829 address to Congress, "The duties of all public officers
are, or at least admit of being made, so plain and simple
that men of intelligence
may readily qualify themselves for
14
their performance."'
On this conception of democratic politics, nineteenthcentury voting practices seem much more logical and much
less sinister than they might otherwise appear. If voters are
no worse than their rulers and are in some ways better, and
if the task of governing is sufficiently simple that virtually
anyone can perform it competently, two conclusions seem to
follow. First, the precise identity of office-holders does not
make a great deal of difference to the quality of public
decisions; and second, whatever criteria voters choose to
apply to candidates for office will likely be adequate to the
task, and will result in a government that is as reasonably
well run as one selected by any other criteria.
Consequently, if voters choose to select from among
fundamentally equally competent candidates on the basis of
12. Letter

from Thomas

Jefferson

to

Peter

Carr

(Aug.

10,

1787),

http://www.infidels.org/library[historical/thomas-jefferson/letter-to-carr.html.
13. ROBERT V. REMINI, THE JACKSONIAN ERA 26 (1989).

14. Andrew Jackson, Message to Congress (Dec. 8, 1829), in PAUL P. VAN
RIPER, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE 36 (1958).
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some tiebreaking criterion such as the candidate's ability to
entertain or his personal financial need, no harm is done;
American democracy will survive intact.
By the turn of the twentieth century, however, these
political mores came under attack from reformers, most
notably the Progressives, who were intent on changing the
way that democratic politics was practiced. Convinced that
the people had habitually, if unintentionally, entrusted
their government to corrupt and incompetent officials, the
Progressives adapted prior American political thought to
the circumstances of a rapidly changing world to create a
new and very different ontology of citizenship. Like
eighteenth-century republicans, the Progressives believed
that the management of a great nation required complex
decisions and informed, technically competent leadership.
But, like nineteenth-century populists, they also believed
that democratic citizens, when properly trained and
educated, possessed the capacity to understand and to
evaluate the policies by which individual candidates
proposed to govern. On this synthetic view, however, the
identity of elected officials mattered a great deal, for
different officials might pursue significantly different
courses of action. Moreover, the choice of criteria by which
to judge candidates was no longer up to the individual
voter, who was now obliged to use criteria that were in
some sense objectively "correct"-those, that is, best suited
to selecting honest, competent leaders who would most
capably pursue the common good in a complex, high-stakes
policy environment.
This conception of politics raised significantly the
prevailing public standards of citizen competence. To the
Progressives, citizens could not properly and honorably sit
back and observe politics as though it were some kind of
spectacle for their entertainment. As the Progressive
historian Benjamin Parke De Witt argued at the time,
"[t]he theory of democracy upon which the entire
progressive movement is based is that every normal citizen
who is mentally and morally fit not only has the right, but
is also under a duty to participate in the solution of political
problems."'1 5 These reformers, then, "helped transform

15. BENJAMIN PARKE DE WITT, THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 190 (1915).
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voting from a social to a civic act," thereby "rationalizing
electoral behavior. 16
Progressive political thought was strongly reinforced by
parallel intellectual developments in other areas. In the
newly emerging field of social science, Max Weber identified
instrumental rationality-a comparatively technical and
demanding form of reasoning-as the naturally dominant
mode of public thought and organized behavior in capitalist
societies. Later, political scientists such as David Truman
and Robert Dahl developed a political model of interest
pluralism, according to which politics consists mainly of a
forum for the pursuit of self-interest by a multiplicity of
interest groups, and for the resolution of their conflicting
claims. Meanwhile, a series of events on a scale never
before seen in human history-two world wars, a global
depression, the advent of nuclear weaponry, and the civil
rights movement, for example-served only to cement the
idea that public affairs was a matter of grave concern to all,
and that all good democratic citizens therefore labored
under an obligation to attend closely to politics.
By the late twentieth century, the public's collective
understanding of politics had solidified into one that placed
significant demands on citizens; according to Michael
Schudson, in this understanding the "twentieth-century
voter was obliged to act out something new and untested in
the political universe-citizenship by virtue of informed
competence."'1 7 This sea change in public political ideology
allowed the authors of a classic, mid-century study of voting
behavior, for example, to write, without fear of contradiction: "The democratic citizen is expected to be well informed
about political affairs. He is supposed to know what the
issues are, what their history is, what the relevant facts
are, what alternatives are proposed, what the party stands
for, what the likely consequences are."' 8 This is a
considerable burden, yet one that voters were expected to
take up with energy and enthusiasm as a kind of obligation
associated with the privilege of living in a free, democratic
society-a privilege that needed to be guarded jealously in a
16. SCHUDSON, supra note 7, at 147.
17. Id. at 173.
18. BERNARD R. BERELSON, ET. AL., VOTING: A STUDY OF OPINION FORMATION
IN A PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 308 (1954).
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world that, for much of the twentieth century, seemed
distinctly hostile to Americans' enjoyment of democratic
self-determination.
Yet in spite of its wide public acceptance, the twentiethcentury model of democratic citizenship was questioned
almost from the moment it emerged. From early critiques
by John Dewey and Walter Lippmann questioning the
coherence of the concept of a democratic public, to Joseph
Schumpeter's rejection of the idea of democratic popular
sovereignty as a pernicious myth, to the empirical findings
of contemporary social science research demonstrating the
ignorance and inattentiveness of the voting public,
academics and other intellectuals have arrived at a
consensus to the effect that the political behavior of the
average American voter falls well short of the twentieth
century's prevailing standards of democratic citizenship.
This gap between democratic expectations and actual voter
performance has occasioned considerable hand-wringing
and anxious reflection, not just in academic circles but
among serious, high-minded politicians and citizens as well.
American democracy thus confronts at the dawn of the
new century a challenge it never faced in the eighteenth or
nineteenth centuries: voters are routinely behaving in ways
at odds with prevailing democratic norms. This is the
result, to be sure, of a significant increase in what those
norms demand of citizens; giving deference to social
superiors and choosing arbitrarily among personal favorites
were not voting practices that greatly taxed the citizenry of
earlier times. Nevertheless, today's problems cannot be
dismissed on the ground that contemporary norms of
democratic citizenship demand more of voters more than
they are capable of giving, any more than we might dismiss
criticisms of, say, the use today of nineteenth-century
methods of child-rearing on the ground that contemporary
norms of parenting hold parents to impossibly high
standards. In the short term, at least, prevailing norms are
facts that necessarily provide the starting point for
analysis.
To say, however, that American voters often fall short
of the demands placed on them in our time by prevailing
norms of democratic citizenship is not necessarily to deny
that there may be better and worse ways of failing to clear
the bar. Surely there is a meaningful difference between
voters who take their obligations seriously and fall short for
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lack of time or ability, for example, and those who have the
time and ability to fulfill the demands of democratic
citizenship but simply decline to expend the required effort.
more
Certainly
the former case suggests much
straightforwardly than the latter the possibility of remedial
measures.
In light of this evolution in public norms, the dispensing
of public office as a kind of gift takes on a different aspect.
Clearly, this is not voting behavior of the kind contemplated
by twentieth-century norms of democratic citizenship. But
taken as one of a variety of possible modes of failure-or, to
put it more positively, as one of several possible second-best
behaviors-how should we evaluate it? Does this kind of
behavior represent a relatively benign form of democratic
default that we may legitimately, if regretfully, excuse? Or
does it suggest something more pernicious, something about
which we ought to be concerned?
IV
All theories of democracy begin from the premise that
politics matters-that the collective choices made by
democratic polities, and the policies pursued by
democratically chosen governments, make a difference in
the lives of citizens. This is the foundational premise of
Lockean liberalism, for example, which holds that people
enter civil society and form governments for the express
purpose of creating and deploying a kind of collective power
sufficient to secure the safety and prosperity that they
would otherwise lack. It is also the foundational premise of
sophisticated modern theories, such as rational choice
models, in which politics is understood as a forum in which
individuals pursue their self-interest by attempting to
influence government policy in their own favor.
Generally accepted theories of democracy, moreover,
tend explicitly to make the soundness of democratic
outcomes depend significantly on the quality of democratic
inputs-votes, opinions, communications with officials, and
so on-provided by citizens. Yet the quality of these inputs
is typically taken for granted on the basis of assumptions
about citizens' incentives: voters are presumed to have
strong incentives to make sound, well-informed, rational
political decisions precisely because the eventual
translation of those decisions into governmental policy is
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presumed to have an impact on citizens' lives of a
magnitude sufficient to induce them to attend to public
affairs.
Some modern democratic theorists, beginning with
Anthony Downs, have, it is true, raised doubts about this
premise by showing that abstention from politics can, in
certain circumstances, be economically rational. But the
practice of dispensing public office as a kind of gift poses a
much more serious and fundamental challenge to these
basic assumptions of democratic theory. As with any form of
gift-giving, to vote for someone for the purpose of giving him
or her a gift of elective office presupposes that electing the
person to the office sought is a nice thing to do for that
person. But no respectable theory of democracy considers its
benefits to accrue to office-holders except in trivial ways.
On the contrary, in every major theory of democracy the
elevation of someone to public office is essentially an
instrumental act that is understood to confer a benefit upon
the voter, or the community, by increasing the likelihood
that certain individually or collectively beneficial policies
will be adopted by the government. In other words, you vote
to do a favor for yourself, or your social group, or the
general public, but not to do a favor for the person for whom
you vote. In a democratic system, the successful candidate
for office is merely an agent of the voting public, and
although principal-agent relationships by definition benefit
agents as well as principals (otherwise no one would ever
agree to be an agent), no principal enters such a
relationship for the sole or main purpose of benefiting the
agent. We employ agents to benefit ourselves.
What does it mean, then, that substantial numbers of
voters are willing to give away their votes as gifts instead of
using them as instruments of public policy? The most
obvious explanation is that these voters do not use their
votes as tools of public policy because they simply do not
believe that their votes are tools of public policy; they do
not, that is, perceive a connection between their votes and
government actions that affect them. Perhaps they think
that every candidate for office will act identically once
elected, so it makes no difference for government policy
whom they select. Or perhaps they believe that government
policies, and actions taken pursuant to those policies, do not
really affect their lives in any meaningful way, again
making the identity and subsequent actions of office-
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holders a matter of indifference. In either case, the
conclusion is quite remarkable: for these voters, voting has
no political salience-it is not a political act.
This is a deeply troubling prospect. Voting, in
democratic normative theory, is the quintessential political
act. Many Americans have struggled mightily for the
privilege. Today, people around the globe are willing to
fight and even die for the opportunity to participate in
politics that voting confers. That some Americans might
find voting to lack any political relevance to their own lives
suggests either that we have finally achieved an ultimately
just society in which the need for politics has withered away
(alas, not likely), or that some voters feel so far removed
from the nation's political life that they cannot perceive any
personal connection to it.
V
In 1999, during his final term in office, Senator Strom
Thurmond voted to convict President Bill Clinton on both
articles of impeachment filed against him by the House of
Representatives. For more than a year during Thurmond's
last term, during 2000 and 2001, the Senate was split
evenly between Democrats and Republicans, making
Thurmond's vote a potential tiebreaker on each and every
issue to come before the Senate. For these reasons alone, it
is difficult to take seriously the idea that Thurmond's 1996
reelection could have been an act without political
consequences for the voters of South Carolina.
Although Sonny Bono did not leave an extensive record
of legislative accomplishment, he was a driving force behind
the posthumously adopted Sonny Bono Copyright Extension
Act, which extended for twenty years the term of existing
copyrights, thereby delaying for a generation the
introduction of large amounts of material into the public
domain and assuring present copyright owners, most of
which are large corporations, a lengthy and continued
stream of exclusive profits. Lois Capps, a former school
nurse who was first elected to Congress in 1998 to succeed
her late husband, Representative Walter Capps, has since
cast votes against restrictions on abortion and cloning; in
favor of allowing school prayer in certain circumstances;
against easing federal gun controls; and against authorizing
the use of force against Iraq. By any definition, these are
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actions with real political consequences for many people on
questions of the highest public political salience, and it is
thus hard to see how voters might reasonably deny the
connection between their votes and the content of public
policy.
On the other hand, it is possible that voters understand
that their votes affect public policy, but see this influence as
having nothing to do with them personally because they do
not in their hearts believe that the policies and actions of
government have any particularly great impact on their
own lives, leaving them largely indifferent to the content of
government policy. This is certainly plausible. There can be
little doubt that the problems facing government today are
more complex than ever before. In earlier times, local
governments, for example, might have had to decide
nothing more complicated than where to build a road, or
put up a fence, decisions whose impact on individual lives
was usually readily apparent. Today, in contrast, even
small local governments not infrequently take up
exceedingly difficult questions of finance, environmental
regulation, and long-term service delivery the resolution of
which may turn on sometimes abstruse principles of science
or economics. It can be difficult to make a farmer believe
that the way he cleans out his hog pen really does raise the
incidence of childhood respiratory disease in a town miles
away, or to convince a homeowner that an immediate
modest capital investment, the need for which is not
apparent to the naked eye, along with a slight increase in
property taxes to finance it, may prevent much more
substantial investments and tax increases in the future.
Yet complexity in governance is nothing new; every era
has had its share of policy questions sufficiently complex to
escape the understanding of some portion of the citizenry,
yet this did not necessarily lead them to deny the political
salience of government action. Some citizens have of course
dealt with the complexity of public policy by taking the
trouble to educate themselves, but many who have lacked
the time, ability, or inclination to study policy questions
personally have in the past typically compensated for their
lack of knowledge and understanding by deferring to the
opinions of others whom they trust and respect. According
to this well-known "two-step" model of public opinion
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formation first developed in the 1950s, 19 political
information is initially collected and evaluated by a
minority of active and engaged individuals, who then relay
the information, along with their opinions, to a wider group
of associates. The views of these "opinion leaders" are not
necessarily dispositive for group members, but they carry
significant weight precisely because opinion leaders earn
their status as a result of the apparent energy, enthusiasm,
and accuracy with which they investigate questions
relevant to their followers. Whether a political opinion
leader is someone in a .position of acknowledged public
authority such as a politician, party leader, or newspaper
editor, or merely an enterprising or well-educated neighbor,
co-worker, or acquaintance, all opinion leaders have in
common an ability to command the trust of those who
accept their leadership.
There is today no shortage of experts willing and eager
to fill the role of opinion leader-just tune in to any of the
cable television news stations, with their endless stream of
red-faced, shouting pundits. What may well be lacking in
today's political environment, however, is trust-the trust
necessary to induce unengaged voters to accept, defer to,
and cast votes based upon the opinions of those who are
better informed and more politically engaged. There are
good reasons to think this may be at least a part of the
problem. In a very important recent book, Hibbing and
Theiss-Morse demonstrate that many voters not only
intensely dislike political conflict, but also tend to presume
that any kind of vigorous disagreement over the details of
public policy must necessarily result either from the
participants' bias in favor of narrow special interests, or
from some kind of self-serving opportunism. 20 These are
views that reflect a deep cynicism toward political
discourse. Robert Putnam has also argued persuasively that
civic disengagement is closely related to declining social

19. The seminal work is ELIHU KATZ & PAUL F. LAZARSFELD, PERSONAL
INFLUENCE: THE PART PLAYED BY PEOPLE IN THE FLOW OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS
(1955).

20. JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY:
AMERICANS' BELIEFS ABOUT How GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK 129-62 (2002),
especially 133 and 142.
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and political trust, 2 1 and that both are part of a regrettable,
broad-based decline in crucially important forms of social
capital.
VI
Let's sum up. Twentieth-century public norms of
democratic citizenship place on voters new and heavy
burdens of information, engagement, and political rationality. Many voters are unable or unwilling to shoulder these
burdens. Some of these voters reject their civic obligation
because they do not perceive voting to have any significant
political salience for their own lives, and to the extent that
their perception may be mistaken, they do not trust public
and social leaders sufficiently to follow their electoral
advice. These voters, then, are in the following position:
they have been given a resource to dispense-their votewhich is of no use to them, but is extremely valuable to
others. This is a dangerous recipe for civic corruption.
To be sure, many voters who believe their vote to be
valueless do with it just what they would do with any
unwanted gift or opportunity-they toss it away, like a junk
mail coupon, by failing to use it. Others, howeverdemocracy's habitual coupon-clippers, one might sayrealize that their vote represents an opportunity, if not for
them then for someone else, that ought not to be discarded.
Some, perhaps, might sell their votes were it legal to do so,
but we need not attribute such crass venality to these
voters; within the larger class of democratic slackers they
are, after all, the thrifty and self-consciously high-minded
ones.
So think about this. Someone gives you something that
is worthless to you, yet you recognize that it has value to
others. You can't sell or trade it. If you consider yourself a
fundamentally nice person, what do you do? Obviously, you
give it away. But to whom? Most likely, you give it to
someone who strikes you as decent and wholesome, and
who asks you for it politely and engagingly. Maybe you will
give it away to the person who seems to need it the most.
Whatever. It makes you feel good to do something nice for

21. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF

AMERICAN COMMUNITY 336-49 (2000), especially 347.
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somebody, even a stranger, so what could possibly be wrong
with the practice? Wouldn't you give a neighbor some old
piece of junk just lying around in your garage if he said he
could make some use of it? Of course you would. So why not
do the same with your vote?
Thus, perversely, does niceness in politics, when
detached from the sense of civic responsibility that ought to
guide it, become a kind of corruption-an act that, when
performed in this way, in this context, can do real damage
to the fabric of civic life. Giving votes as gifts to favored
candidates is corrupting, first, to the individuals who
engage in it. What kind of character is formed in someone
who has items to give away that have neither intrinsic nor
transaction value to the giver, but are valued highly by a
small number of others? In an exchange, both parties to the
transaction enjoy a certain measure of dignity. But there is
little dignity in a transaction in which the benefit runs in
only one direction, where those who want supplicate, and
those who have merely choose among the supplicants.
This is not just begging. Begging is without doubt an
act that is demeaning not only to those who are forced to
beg, but to those who are begged. But this is worse: giving
away one's vote to one among several candidates for any
office involves a kind of competitive begging. To choose
among supplicants, one must in essence hold an audition,
but because an audition for a valueless thing lacks any
socially recognizable purpose, it is necessarily an audition
without contextual standards. This in turn means that the
standards to be applied for choosing among supplicants will
be those chosen arbitrarily by the giver, but to subject
another to one's arbitrary power is just as demeaningindeed, in some ways more so-than to endure the exercise
of arbitrary power. If, as Madison argued, human beings
are by nature weak and unable to resist eventually
indulging their baser impulses, 22 how long can it be before
niceness turns to arbitrariness, and arbitrariness degenerates ultimately into cruelty? Better, surely, to throw your
ballot into the trash than to corrupt and debase yourself by
assuming a role that makes of you a potential tyrant.
Giving votes, and in consequence offices, as gifts is also
corrupting collectively and systemically in that it corrupts,
22. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
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by betraying and breaking down, the basic principles of
democratic self-governance. At bottom, dispensing offices as
gifts is a form of patronage, and patronage is destructive of
the values that ultimately sustain democracy. After all,
patronage is by definition a form of preferential treatment
based on arbitrarily and unequally distributed opportunities to gain the personal favor of the authority dispensing
the patronage. Consequently, even in its mildest forms,
contradicts
the foundational
democratic
patronage
principles of intrinsically equal citizens enjoying equal
opportunity based on merit.
But the kind of patronage we are talking about here is
not a mild form. During earlier periods in American politics,
patronage consisted mainly of dispensing low-level government jobs to party loyalists. Although Americans ultimately
rejected this kind of patronage and outlawed it through civil
service reform and ethical regulation of office-holders, its
defenders, who number among them two current members
of the Supreme Court, 23 have at least been able to offer a
colorable justification for it. They argue, in substance, that
the dispensing of government jobs as political patronage
helps ensure party cohesion and discipline, which in turn
enhances democratic accountability by improving the
ability both of the incumbent administration to fulfill its
campaign promises, and of voters to turn out and replace
officials who have done a poor job.
Unlike classic political patronage, however, for which a
civic justification may thus in principle be provided, the
kind of patronage exercised when voters dispense elective
office as gifts to candidates cannot be so justified. It has all
the defects of classic patronage-arbitrariness, favoritism,
inequality-without any of the potential advantages
because there is, by definition, no quid pro quo benefit to
the voter or the public. Voters, remember, can conceive of
dispensing offices as gifts to candidates only if they do not
see their votes as conferring any potential advantage to
themselves. This kind of patronage is therefore purposeless,
and consequently damaging to civic life.
Finally, giving away public offices as gifts undermines
the system of incentives that sustains and legitimates
23. See Justice Scalia's dissent, joined by Justice Kennedy, in Rutan v.
Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
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democratic forms of government. Democracy is legitimate
and justifiable only to the extent that it is a system that
makes officials responsive to the public will. Voting, on this
model, is the vehicle by which citizens obtain responsive
government because votes can and should be used to shape,
through electoral reward or punishment, the performance of
office-holders. Once voters begin to allocate their votes on
some basis other than the performance of incumbent
officials, or the anticipated performance in office of nonincumbent candidates, the link between the wishes of the
citizenry and the actions of the government is broken,
thereby impairing popular sovereignty itself. All that
patronage-based voting practices can ever obtain for voters
is a steady supply of supplications from candidates that
respond to voters' individual tastes in electoral supplication. It cannot, however, produce policy responsiveness. Of
course, if public policy has no effect on voters' lives there
might be nothing wrong with such a system, odd and
illogical though it might then be. But the moment policies
begin to have such effects-and it is not implausible to
think that public policies always affect voters in some
way-democracy is put at risk.
VII
Voters, it seems, need to treat candidates for public
office with a kind of tough love that many seem unwilling or
unable to provide. "You're a nice enough fellow, Mr.
Candidate," they need to able to say, "and I'd love to do
something nice for you, but I'm afraid that sending you to
the capital is not the right way to do you a kindness." If
enough voters cannot bring themselves to formulate such
ideas and act on them, might some kind of institutional
reform sufficiently stiffen their spines? A few possibilities
come to mind.
To the extent that dispensing public offices as gifts is a
kind of patronage, we might approach it as we have often
approached other forms of patronage: by prohibiting the
appointing authority from deciding who fills the office. In
this case, that would mean denying voters the opportunity
to decide the identity of the specific individuals who are to
fill elective offices. Perhaps the most straightforward way to
preserve popular electoral control over government while
simultaneously denying voters the opportunity to vote for
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specific individuals would be to allow them to vote instead
only for political parties-to move, that is to say, to a party
list electoral system.
In a party list system, used throughout most of Europe
and in South Africa and Israel, each party prepares a list of
its candidates for legislative seats, listing a number of
candidates equal to the total number of seats to be filled.
Voters then go to the polls, but rather than voting for
individuals on the party lists, cast votes instead only for
their favored party. On the basis of this voting, each party
is awarded a number of legislative seats corresponding to
the proportion of the popular vote won by that party. The
party then fills those seats by moving down its list of
candidates until it has gone as far as it is entitled to go. In
such a system, the identity of office-holders is thus
controlled by the party, and voters are consequently
induced to choose among parties mainly on the basis of the
policies to which the parties and their candidates are
committed.
Such a change would naturally be quite unpopular in
the United States. Indeed, we used to have a system
something like this under the old party convention system
of nominating candidates. Under that system, candidates
were selected, as they are in party list systems, by party
leaders and then simply offered to the public in the general
election. Public dissatisfaction with this system, however,
led ultimately to the widespread introduction of the direct
primary election, in which the voting public gets two
chances to determine the identity of individual officeholders, once during the primary and again during the
general election. Even elsewhere in the world, the
traditional closed list primary system is losing ground in
favor of hybrid systems, such as the German "topping off'
system, in which voters get two votes, one for an individual
representative of their choice and another for their party.
Another possible kind of reform would be to take
precisely the opposite approach. Instead of fighting voters'
impulse to dispense offices like gifts by depriving them of
the opportunity to vote for individuals, we might attempt to
channel those impulses in directions that would be less
harmful to civic life. One way to do this would be to create
new elective offices that would be, in essence, throwaway
offices with little real power. Such offices could therefore be
given freely as gifts without the risk attendant upon
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handing real power to those unqualified to exercise it.
Indeed, such offices could conceivably be "marketed" to
voters explicitly as offices that ought to be used to reward
favored citizens. The hope would be that by providing voters
with a legitimate outlet for their gift-giving impulses, they
would find it easier to allocate more important offices on
the basis of the kind of policy and performance criteria upon
which democratic systems depend.
A good example of such an office is the office of
president in parliamentary systems. Typically, the president of a parliamentary nation is little more than a
figurehead who presides at official occasions and serves
mainly as a symbol and embodiment of the values and
aspirations of the citizenry. Creating similar offices at the
national, state, and local levels in the United States might
allow those citizens who are tempted to give away office as
a kindness to indulge that appetite legitimately, and
without doing violence to the quality of democratic selfgovernance or civic life.
A final possible reform measure would be to create, and
to distribute to voters, a new and different kind of goodie to
dispense to personal favorites. At present, the only
patronage that voters, as voters, have available to them to
dispense is public office itself. Perhaps if we give them
something else to use their votes to distribute, they will be
able to approach conventional electoral decisions in the
proper frame of mind. So, for example, we might create a
Great Americans Hall of Fame, and at every election allow
voters to elect several people to that august institutionsort of like American Idol, but with real ballots and all the
hoopla of a general election. Or we could permit voters to
dispense hard cash on the barrel to deserving ex-actors and
political widows by allowing voters at every general election
to distribute a few large cash honoraria, or perhaps some
lifetime public pensions.
VIII
All institutional arrangements rest on foundational
assumptions about the ways in which institutional actors
will behave, and the success of institutions therefore often
depends heavily on the conformity of those who actually
inhabit the institutions with the behavioral norms
presupposed by the institutional structure. A system of
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public roadways, for example, presupposes that drivers will
use the roads to get from one place to another as efficiently
and expeditiously as possible, and all of its various rules
and customs flow from this behavioral assumption at its
core. When drivers use public roadways for other
purposes-to be seen by their friends, to engage in drag
racing, as a venue for an impromptu dance party-the
system begins to break down, sometimes with dangerous
results. The institution of boxing presupposes that each
fighter will attempt to win each bout. When a pugilist uses
a fight to pursue other goals-earning a big payday, for
example-by engaging in behavior that the institution does
not contemplate-taking a dive-the institution is badly
damaged.
The institution of democratic politics is no different. It
presupposes that institutional actors such as voters and
politicians will behave in certain ways, for certain purposes,
and the entire edifice can be threatened if enough of these
actors begin to behave in ways that the system does not
contemplate, for the purpose of achieving goals that the
system does not recognize. Democracy is, to be sure, a more
commodious institution than driving or boxing in that it
does not dictate the participants' ends with nearly the same
degree of specificity. It does, however, presuppose that
voters have political goals, and that they will use their
votes instrumentally to achieve those goals. Politicians, for
their part, are presumed by democratic institutions to offer
themselves to voters as public servants who promise to
implement to the best of their ability the policies approved
by their constituents.
When politicians run for office not to serve their
constituents but to indulge their vanity, democracy suffers.
When voters cast their votes not in the service of some
conception of public policy but to indulge sentimental
feelings of kindness or pity toward candidates, the system is
similarly stressed. The inappropriate motivations of
candidates are, unfortunately, difficult to control, but they
are frequently not all that difficult to detect. Voters can go a
long way toward ensuring the proper operation of
democratic institutions simply by exercising a certain
degree of self-control. You like being nice? Fine. Be nice to
your family, to your neighbors, to your dog. But pleasedon't be nice to politicians. They may appreciate it, but the
rest of us can't afford it.

